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Why U.S. Wage and Employment Behavior
Differs From That in Britain and Japan
ABSTRACT
This paper argues that rigid wages cannot provide the underpinnings
of a universally valid theory of the business cycle, simply because wages
are not universally rigid. Several different statistical techniques sug-
gest that wage rates in the U.K. and Japan are between three and 15 times
more flexible than in the U.S. during the postwar period. Corresponding
to greater flexibility in wages, these two countries also exhibit more
stable employment behavior over the business cycle.
In historical data covering the period between the late nineteenth cen—
tury and 1940, U.S. wage behavior appears to be much more similar to that
in Britain and Japan. The contrast between the prewar data and the postwar
data, where the U.S. is a definite outlier, suggests that the 1948 invention
of the three—year staggered U.S. wage contract may be the crucial factor
underlying sluggish U.S. postwar wage dynamics.
A theoretical section attempts to distill from recent literature those
features of labor market institutions that are regarded as optimal by
economic theory. Japanese institutions exhibit more similarity to this
theoretical paradigm than those in the U.S. or U.K. Economic theory pre-
dicts that long—duration contracts, like those in the postwar U.S., are
more likely to emerge when the perceived cost of renegotiation is high,
but we must appeal to history and cultural differences to explain why con-
flict avoidance plays a more prominent role in the development of Japanese
labor market institutions than in the American case. In this comparison
Britain is the odd—man—out, with well—publicized industrial strife, to-
gether with short contract durations. I appeal to history, the different
legal tradition, and the nature of the British unions themselves to explain





(312) 492—3616If a poli were to be conducted among American academic economists
to select "The Most Mystifying Economic Phenomenon of Our Time," surely
the sticky nominal wage rate would emerge at or near the top of the list.
The slow and partial response of the nominal wage rate to changes in
aggregate nominal spending has been a central postulate of macroeconomic
theory for the past 45 years, from Keynes' General Theory, through the
standard postwar textbook Keynesian paradigm, to the more modern fixed—
wage—price models of Robert Barro and Herschel Grossman (1976), and
Edmond Malinvaud (1977). Unwilling passively to accept nominal wage
rigidity as an unexplained assumption, many labor—market theorists have
followed the lead of Costas Azariadis (1975) and Martin Baily (1975) in
building models to explain rigid wages and layoff unemployment as the
rational outcome of a profit—maximizing calculus.
As I pointed out in an early critique of the Azariadis—Baily model
(l976a) their assumptions cannot explain cycles in employment, but
rather why workers would want fixed incomes, i.e., a fixed wage rate
and fixed employment. Soon thereafter, Barro (1977) went one step further
and argued that contract theory is a "facade" which cannot explain why
workers would choose a rigid wage and variable employment in preference
to the classical equilibrium quantity of employment that equates the
marginal product of labor with the marginal value of time. Now an
examination of the evidence has led me to the realization that rigid
wages cannot provide the underpinnings for a universally valid theory of
the business cycle, simply because wages are not universally rigid. I
document below with postwar quarterly data that the share of fluctuations
in the manufacturing wage bill taking the form of nominal wage changes,2
as compared to changes in hours worked, is five to ten times greater in
Britain and Japan than in the United States. I then argue that American
economists, whose theoretical ingenuity is matched by their institutional
chauvinism, have not succeeded in developing an adequate economic ex-
planation of labor—market arrangements; their theories that purport to
explain wage stickiness are mainly based on elements that do not differ
across nations and thus have little potential for explaining why the degree
of wage flexibility is much greater in some places than in others.
It seems remarkable that the modern American literature on labor—
market contracts contains no mention of cross—country differences in the
extent of wage flexibility, much less any explanation of these differences.'
This paper begins the difficult task of providing such an explanation, con-
centrating on just three countries to limit its scope. It seems obvious
to include my country (the U.S.), and yours (the U.K.). The choice of
the third country is also easy, because the recent Japanese achievement of
flexibility in both nominal and real wage rates has made possible the re-
markable 2 percent rates of both inflation and unemployment experienced in
1979 and 1980, a "second Japanese miracle" to accompany the first and more
widely recognized productivity—quality—export miracle.2 Like any attempt
to explain either miracle, this study of Japanese wage—setting and employ-
ment determination must ultimately come to grips with the history of insti-
tutions and with culture, i.e., shared customs and habits. Can we duplicate
Japanese performance through the manipulation of policy tools and incentives
that we usually classify as "economic," or must we explore the less fa-
miliar terrain of collectively remolding institutions and customs?3
Barro's critique of contract theory argues that business cycles are
due to "easily correctible malfunctions" in private market arrangements
(1979). But his approach represents a dead end, because it exhibits no
recognition that private market arrangements differ across countries, nor
any explanation of such differences. This inquiry into the source of
institutional differences asks, in essence, whether a decentralized free—
market economy possesses a servomechanism that automatically reforms
institutions and customs that lead to an inefficient macroeconomic per-
formance, or whether it can become stuck in an inefficient Akerlof—type
equilibrium (1978). Institutional constraints together with decentralized
decision—making may leave individual agents in a "prisoners' dilemma,"
unable without collective action to loosen the institutional constraints
that bind them.
Any economist who dares to mention institutions as central determin-
ants of macroeconomic performance had better tread carefully, lest he be
branded a dangerous renegade or traitor. One only has to recall the
British debate of a decade ago between cost—push and monetarist theories
of inflation to recognize that an appeal to institutional or social dif-
ferences is likely to be labelled a distressing resort to "amateur socio-
logy. and politics" which can plan "no part whatsoever in the problem."3
In my view inflation is basically a monetary phenomenon, in the sense that
a monetary expansion is necessary to propogate inflation, but institutions
can influence the willingness of the central bank to print money. For
instance, ceteris paribusacentral bank would be less willing to engineer
a monetary deceleration if existing institutions were likely to prevent a4
rapid response of wages and prices, forcing output to take up the slack,
than in an alternative society in which the same spending deceleration
were likely to be rapidly absorbed by wages and prices with little output
response. In this view inflation is the outcome of a genuine two—way
interaction between the central bank and the wage—price adjustment process,
in which both economic and non—economic aspects of the institutional en-
vironment determine the feasibility of slowing simultaneously the growth
rates of money, wages, and prices.
The paper begins in Part I, which reviews a set of identities giving
the conditions necessary for wage rigidity to imply fluctuations in em-
ployment, and then comments on the recent claims by Barro (1977) and
Robert Hall (1980) that rigid wages do not imply or explain employment
fluctuations. Part II displays and analyzes data on the flexibility of
wages, hours, and employment in the U.K., U.S., and Japan, including both
postwar quarterly and annual historical data prior to 1940. Part III
develops the notion of 'tidealT labor market institutions from the stand-
point of macroeconomic efficiency, asking how wages, hours, and employ-
ment should be adjusted in response to nominal demand disturbances. Part
IV then juxtaposes actual labor—market institutions in the U.K., U.S.,
and Japan with the ideal woridof economic theory. Are there economic
factors that can explain the inter—country differences, or must we appeal
at least in part to politics, history, and/or culture to complete the
explanation? Part V summarizes the conclusions.
This paper is complementary to the recent cross—country studies of
Jeffrey Sachs (1979), and William Branson and Julio Rotemberg (1980),
which document the contrast between nominal wage inertia in the postwar5
U.S. and real wage inertia in Europe and Japan, and examine the theoretical
and policy implications of this contrast. Here I begin with another pro-
cedure for documenting the difference in nominal wage behavior among the
U.K., U.S., and Japan, and then concentrate on explaining its causes
rather than its consequences. Real wage inertia plays no role in my analysis,
reflecting my finding that the real wage rate in quarterly postwar data for
the U.K. and Japan displays, if anything, more variability than in the U.S.
The paper's scope is broader than most, in its attention to three
countries and to non—economic factors, but nevertheless is carefully
circumscribed. I am concerned with the dynamic response of the aggre-
gate supply curve to nominal demand fluctuations that are taken to be
exogenous. No attention is given to cross—country differences in saving
behavior, openness to foreign trade, or other factors that might explain
why demand fluctuations have been more severe in one place than another.
Feedback from inflation to nominal demand (e.g., through Pigou and ex-
pectations effects) and to investment and productivity growth are ignored.
Although the response of the inflation process to nominal demand swings
depends both on the firm's price—setting decisions in product markets
and its wage— and employment—setting decisions in labor markets, the
paper concentrates on the latter and refers the reader to a recent com-
panion piece on the product market (1981a).6
I. IS THERE A CONNECTION BETWEEN WAGE STICKINESS
ANDEMPLOYMENTFLUCTUATIONS?
Although most economists now accept as obvious the proposition that
the sluggish adjustment of wages increases the variability ofemployment
over the business cycle, nevertheless some have argued that wage sticki-
ness is not a central issue. In this view the fixity of wages would not
necessarily imply layoffs or fluctuations in employment, since "even in
contracts that specify ex ante the value of nominal wages over some in-
terval of time, it would be mutually advantageous for workers and firms
to determine levels of employment in an efficient manner" (Barro, 1979,
p. 54). There is, in short, a "limited allocational role of the wage
payment for employment" (Hall, 1980, p. 92).
Adopting the practice of designating proportional growth rates as
lower case letters, we can write down an identity that displays the rela-
tionship of the growth rate of nominal GNP (y) to that of the nominal
wage (w), hours per man per week (h), employee-weeks per year (e), and
nominal non—labor income (n):
(1) y p(w + h + e) + (1—p)n,
where p is labor's income share. The cyclical behavior of the variables
in (1) can be examined if we purge both sides of the equation of the in—
* * * fluenceof trend growth in real output (q ),hours(h ),andemployment (e ):
* * * * * * * (2) y —q p[w —(q—h —e ) + (h—h ) + (e—e )}+ (l—p)(n—q ).
Thesimple truths contained in this expression become more obvious when7
we combine terms, using w to designate trend productivity growth
** * * (q—h —e ),h'for the deviation of hours growth from trend (h—h ),e
* forthe deviation of employment growth from trend (e—e ),anda !that
to designate the growth of nominal GNP and non—labor income relative to
* trendoutput (yy—q ; nn—q ):5
(3) y p(w —w+ h' + e') + (l—p)n.
In the long run, when the cyclical hours and employment deviations
are zero (e' =h'=0),(3) states simply that output—trend—adjusted
nominal GNP growth must be a weighted average of trend unit labor cost
(w —w)and the growth of adjusted nominal non-labor income. But there
are clearly no arithmetically necessary implications of nominalwage
rigidity for the cyclical behavior of employment, because fluctuations
in nominal CNP growth on the left—hand side of (3) can be offset by
changes in hours (h') or in non—labor income (n) even if both wages and
employment are fixed.
The Barro—Hall argument cited above states that in principle there
is nothing to prevent the firm from offering each employee a contract that
fixes labor income, i.e., the wage rate, hours per week, and weeks of
employment, with profit fluctuations (n) taking up the slack. However,
this proposition is valid only for very special sorts of firms that are
risk—neutral and face perfect capital markets that are equally unperturbed
by profit instability. The downward pressure on profits that occurs
when a drop in nominal GNP is accompanied by a fixed wage bill must have
allocative consequences if it persists for any length of time, by altering
the market's expectations of the future net worth of the firm, and8
consequently by raising its supply price of capital and reallocating
capital elsewhere. The firm is thus under pressure to shift some of the
burden of the adjustment from profits to the wage bill. There is surely
some drop in nominal income large enough, or of sufficiently long dura-
tion, to force firms to adopt some combination of wage cuts, "work
sharing" (reductions in hours per employee), or a reduction of employment.
We can go further and note that (3) contains some hints that might
contribute to an economic explanation of cross—country differences in the
stability of employment. First, profits will be able to absorb rela-
tively more of a nominal GNP change, and thus the wage bill will be
forced to absorb less, the larger is the normal profit share (1—1-'). The
larger share of non—labor income in Japan than in Britain or the U.S.
might help to explain how large Japanese firms can afford to offer their
employees lifetime employment. Further, to the extent that the Japanese
bonus system can be regarded as a form of profit sharing, as is argued
by Masanori Hashimoto (1979), the effective share of profit—type income
is increased, and there is a larger buffer to insulate the remainder of
the wage bill. If the change in wages (w) consists of the change in the
wage base Cv) and in the bonus (b) with weights pand(l—p), and if the
change in the bonus is a fixed fraction aofthe change in non—labor
income (b =on),then (3) becomes:
(4) y p(iv — + h' + &) + [(l—p) + p(1—Ji)a}n.
A final difference among countries suggested by ()and(4) is the nature
of the link between firms and capital markets. British and American firms,
financed largely by equity, may be more sensitive to fluctuations in share9
values caused by profit instability, than debt—financed Japanese firms.
The bankers who oversee loans to Japanese firms, with the Central Bank
and Ministry of International Trade and Industry looking over their
shoulder, may take a longer view than U.K. and U.S. shareholders.6 The
converse proposition, that debt finance makes profits less stable,
may not matter for Japanese firms if far—sighted bankers and government
agencies allow firms to look beyond the short run.10
II. SOME EVIDENCE ON THE RESPONSIVENESS OF
WAGES, HOURS, ANDEMPLOYMENT
II.2Postwar Quarterly Data for Manufacturing
This section analyzes postwar quarterly data on the volatility of
wages, hours, and employment in the U.S., U.K., and Japan. Comparable
data across countries seem easiest to obtain if we limit our attention
to manufacturing. The wage data include fringe benefits for the U.S.
and bonuses for Japan. Two measures of volatility are examined, the
standard deviation of rates of change, and the coefficient ofresponse
of each variable to changes in nominal GNP. The standard deviations in
Table 1 are calculated for two periods, ending respectively in 1972 and
1980, in order to determine whether the results for the period ending
in 1980 are dominated by special features of the two oil shocks that
occurred after 1972. The starting date of 1963:Ql is determined by the
1960 starting date of the U.K. and Japanese data in our source, and by
unusual behavior of the Japanese hours and employment series in 1961
and early 1962. The computations are based on four—quarter overlapping
rates of change, in order to minimize problems of seasonality and high—
frequency quarter—to—quarter volatility. The procedure involves esti-
mating a regression in which the only right—hand variable is a single
constant for the period ending in 1972, and two constants (broken at
1972:Q4) for the period ending in 1980.
The qualitative differences among the three nations seem unaffected
by the choice of the 1972 or 1980 termination date. The striking finding,
presented in lines 3 through 6 of Table 1, is that a much largerTABLE 1
Standard Deviations of Four—Quarter Percentage Rates ofChange
of Manufacturing Wage Rates, Hours, andEmployment
11
a. The full—period results include two constantsdefined respectively











U.S. U.K. Japan u.s. U.K. Japan
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
3.82 4.35 4.97 3.563.26 3.68
1.69 5.29 4.84 1.66 3.40 2.83
4.78 3.22 1.09 4.06 2.70 0.91
1.09 1.74 1.98 1.06 1.37 1.17
4.05
Addenda
6. Ratio of line 2 to 3 0.35
7. Ratio of line 2 to 50.42





4.44 0.41 1.26 3.11
2.38 0.491.74 1.32
2.78 0.82 1.74 2.5012
fraction of the variability of the manufacturing wage bill takes the
form of nominal wage changes relative to changes in hours worked (h+e)
or employment (e) in Britain and Japan than in the U.S. The ratio ex-
hibited in line 6 of wage variability relative to hours variability is
only 0.35 in the U.S., but is 4.7 times larger in Britain and 12.7
times larger in Japan for the 1963—80 period. For the shorter 1963—72
period, the ratio is 3.1 times larger in Britain and 7.6 times larger in
Japan, indicating that part but by no means all of the cross—country
differences are associated with the extreme volatility of wage changes
experienced in Britain and Japan at the time of the first oil shock in
197 3—75.
A surprising finding on line 5 is that employment in the U.K. is
no less stable than in Japan. Line 7 exhibits the ratio of wage to em-
ployment variability, and for the full period this ratio is 0.42 for
the U.S., but is almost six times larger in both Britain and Japan. For
the shorter period the British and Japanese ratios are 3.6 and 2.7 times
larger, respectively. Why do these ratios differ more for Japan in line
6 than line 7, i.e., why is the volatility of hours worked (h+e) so much
less than either of the components, hours per week (h) or employment Ce)?
The distributed lag analysis discussed below reveals that, more than in
the other two nations, hours per week in Japan are a temporary buffer that
absorbs part of the impact of a swing in nominal spending, but only for a
single quarter. Then, over the next four or five quarters, employment
begins to respond in the direction of the spending disturbance, while
hours per week return to normal, thus creating a negative correlation
between hours per week and employment changes during those quarters.13
A final addendum in line 8 of Table 1 presents figures on the vola-
tility of the real wage in the three countries for the two periods. The
results show quite consistently, for both the long and short period, that
the volatility of both real and nominal wage rates is greater in Britain
and Japan than in the U.S.Here are the ratios of nominal and
real wage variability relative to the U.S. for the other two countries:
Nominal wage, from Real wage, from







These simple calculations lead me to question the characterization by
Sachs (1979) and Branson—Rotemberg (1980) of the U.S. as having stable
nominal wage growth and variable real wage growth, and other major
industrialized nations as having the reverse. For both sample periods,
real wage growth in the U.K. and Japan was between two and three times
more variable than in the U.S.
I recently presented evidence that the responsiveness of the aggre-
gate U.S. price deflator to changes in nominal GNP has varied widely
over time. Because price changes have ranged from very sticky to very
flexible over U.S. history, I called attention to the absence of any
explanation for this parameter shift in conventional macroeconomic theory
(l981a, pp. 500—502). Just as that analysis was based on a regression of14
quarterly changes in prices on a distributed lag of current and past
changes in nominal GNP, so here in Table 2 I present a parallel character-
ization of differences in the labor—market adjustment process in the
three countries, by regressing various components of the wage bill on
current and past changes in nominal GNP. In contrast to Table 1, where
four—quarter overlapping changes are calculated, here the data are one—
quarter changes, expressed at annual rates (i.e., multiplied by four).
All lag distributions are constrained to lie along a fourth—degree poly-
nomial, with a zero end—point constraint. As explained in the notes to
Table 2, all regressions also include a constant and a trend term. The
long—period results for all countries include a variable to represent the
influence of changes in food and energy prices in the l970s, and all
regressions for the U.S. also include dummy variables.to capture the
effects of the 1971—74 Nixon control program.8
Of all the sums of coefficients in Table 2 showing the response of
each variable to changes in nominal GNP in the current and preceding
eight quarters, the two sets that stand out are those on lines 1 and 2.
First, the responsiveness of the manufacturing wage bill to nominal GNP
in the U.K. and Japan is only half that in the U.S. Second, and more
interesting for this investigation, nominal wages are much more
responsive in the U.K. and Japan than in the U.S. for both sample periods.
As shown on line 6, the ratio of the nominal wage rateresponse (line 2)
to the wage bill response (line 1) is 10 per&ent or less in the U.S.,
and between 57 and 128 percent in Britain and Japan.
What accounts for the relatively high wage elasticities in Japan in
the full period, and in Britain in the shorter period? The Japanese ex—15
TABLE 2
Sums of Coefficients when Components of the Change
in the Manufacturing Wage Bill are Regressed
on Current and Eight Lagged Changes in Nominal GNPa
1961:Q1—1980:Q3 1961:Ql—1972:Q4
u.s.bCU.K.b japanb u.s.C U.K. Japan
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables
1. w + h + e 2.16*** 0.91** Q95** 2.64*** 0.84* l.38**
* ** 2.w 0.06 0.59 1.22 0.28 0.87 0.80
* *** *** 3.h + e 2.10 0.32 —0.28 2.36 —0.03 0.58
** * 4.h —0.19 0.20 —0.31 —0.20 —0.04 —0.25
5.e 2.29 0.12 0.03 2.57 0.00 0.83
6. Ratio of line 2
to line 1 0.03 0.65 1.28 0.11 1.04 0.57
Notes
a. All regressions include a constant and a trend term.
b. All regressions also include changes in the difference between the growth
rates of the U.S. consumption deflator, respectively including and excluding
expenditures on food and energy.
c. Regressions also include dummy variables for the impact of the Nixon controls.
Asterisks designate significance levels of sums of coefficients, as follows:
10 percent (*),5percent (**),and1 percent (***).16
perience is dominated by the 1974 wage explosion, in whichthe four—
quarter change in wages reached 27 percent in l974:Q2 and1974:Q3, and
which was partly but not completely accommodatedby nominal GNP growth
(with peaks of 20.5 percent in l973:Q4 and 19.4percent in l974:Q3).
Nominal wages and GNP growth droppedprecipitously in 1975 to respective
troughs of 7.7 percent (l975:Q2) and 8.0 percent (l975:Q3).Partly be-
cause wages accelerated more than nominal GNP in 1974, thefour—quarter
growth rate of manufacturing hours worked (h + e) fell from 1.6percent
(1973:Q1) to —5.2 percent (1975:Ql), and then reboundedto 1.2 percent
(1976:Ql). This decline in hours in 1974, while nominal GNPwas rising
rapidly, accounts for the otherwise puzzling negative coefficients for
Japan in column (3), line 3•9In the shorter 1963—72 sample period,
the growth of hours worked (line 3) shows theexpected positive response
to nominal GNP changes. The large Britishwage response in the short sam—
pie period stems from the monetary accommodation of the 1970wage explosion.
Nominal wage growth, again calculated on a four—quarterchange basis, ac-
celerated from 5.0 percent (1969:Q2) to 12.5percent (197l:Q1), and then
jumped after a brief hiatus to 15.6 percent (1972:Q4). Nominal GNPgrowth
displayed a similar pattern, increasing from 4.5 percent (1969:Q3) to 14.6
percent (197l:Q3), and then jumping after a short relapse to 18.4percent
(l973:Ql).
This chronology raises the issue of direction of causation. Did
nominal GNP changes cause wage changes, or vice versa? Work by John Taylor
(1980) stresses the central role of policy accommodation in determining
the degree of inertia in the wage—price process. If nominal GNP is at
least partly endogenous, and responds quickly to wage changes, then
the sums of coefficients in Table 2 may be contaminated by simultaneous
equations bias, with an upward bias if the reverse feedback to nominal GNP17
is positive, and a downward bias if the reverse feedback isnegative. A
method introduced by Cliver Granger (1969) can be used to test forexo—
geneity in a two—way relationship. A variable, sayy (nominal GNP
change) is regressed on a constant, a time trend, its own lagged values,
and lagged values of the other variable of interest,say, w (wage change):
M N
(5) = +a1t + $y_ + E y.w. + C
i=l
Now the variableis exogenous with respect to w if the lagged w's
fail to make a significant contribution to the explanation ofover and
above the serial correlation process captured by the lagged values of.
Asyimnetric test for the exogeneity of w with respect to £ is available
with the 's and w's in (5) reversed. Such a test for the exogeneity of
wage change amounts to running the regressions of Table 2 with the cur-
rent nominal GNP change omitted .but the lagged values included.
The results of the Granter tests are exhibited in Table 3. Line A
shows the sums of coefficients Ci.) on lagged wage changes in the equations
for nominal GNP change. The sums of coefficients are negative in both
sample periods for the U.S., positive for the U.K., and mixed for Japan.
Only in the short sample period for the U.S., however, does the signifi-
cance level reach 5 percent. One would expect the negative feedback from
wage to nominal GNP changes for the U.S. to cause the coefficients in
Table 2 to be biased downward, and indeed the U.S. coefficients in line
B of Table 3 are modestly higher. Nevertheless, the conclusion still
emerges that the responsiveness of wage change to past nominal GNP changes
is several times higher in Britain and Japan than in the U.s.18
TABLE 3
The Two—Way Relation Between
Quarterly Changes in Nominal GNP
and Manufacturing Wage Rates
1962:Q2 -l980:Q3 1962:Q2 -l972:Q4
U.S. U.K. Japan U.S. U.K. Japan
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Nominal GNP Equations,
Sum of Coefficients on
Lagged Wages —0.56 0.58* 0.07 l.ll 0.91* 1.48*
B. Wage Change Equations,
Sum of Coefficients of ** ** **
LaggedNominal GNP 0.11 0.70 0.78 0.39 0.79 1.25
C F Ratios for
Inclusion of
1. Wages in Nominal 0.31 0.83 0.76 1.18 5.89 1.05
GNP Equation
** *
2.Nominal CNP in 0.92 2.21 0.53 0.97 1.98 1.47
Wage Equation
Note: Asterisks designate significance levels of sums of coefficients, as
follows: 10 percent (*),5percent (**),and1 percent (***).19
For this paper, however, the main issue is the unique nature of the
sluggish wage response in the U.S. Is this a phenomenon that economic
theory can help to explain, or must economists throw up their hands in
despair, turning the question over to the speculations of historians and
sociologists? Because the most obvious institutional feature of the U.S.
manufacturing labor market is the three—year staggered wage contract, we
proceed in the next section to examine differences between American,
British, and Japanese wage responsiveness before 1940, that is, prior to
the introduction of the three—year U.S. union wage contract.
11.2 Pre-1940 Data on Wage Rates and GNP Deflators
Prior to World War II comparable data on key labor market variables
are harder to obtain than for the most recent two decades. I have
simplified my task by concentrating on the response of wage changes to
nominal GNP, in order to learn whether sums of coefficients analogous to
those in Table 2, line 2, differ as much among the three countries be-
fore World War II as afterwards. It is possible to find annual nominal
wage rate and GNP data going back to 1870 in the U.K., 1878 in Japan,
and 1889 in the U.S. Allowing for first—differencing and lags, I have
estimated response coefficients of wage rates to nominal GNP changes for
sample periods ending in 1940 for each country, and beginning in 1873
for the U.K., 1881 for Japan, and 1892 for the U.S. And, although the
main focus of the paper is on wages rather than prices, I also present
analogous results for the response of the GNP deflator to changes in
nominal GNP——in order to display for the U.K. and Japan results analogous
to those discussed for the U.S. in two recent papers of mine (1980, 1981a).20
Since the data are unfamiliar, simple means and standard deviations
for three sub—periods are presented, as a basic introduction, in Table 4.
The period of World War I and its aftermath is singled out for special
attention, as a result of my finding (198la)' that U.S. prices were much
more responsive to spending changes during that interval than before or
afterwards. The U.K. and Japan data also share this feature of a much
higher mean and standard deviation of wage and price change during 1914—22
than either before or after. Another finding is that Japanese spending
growth was the most volatile before 1914, with the U.S. most volatile
after 1922, and the British achieving the most stable demand growth in
each period. But perhaps the most interesting conclusion to be drawn
from Table 4 is that, in stark contrast to Table 1 for the postwar years,
there was no tendency for U.S. wage changes to be more stable than in
Britain and Japan. In fact the standard deviation of the year—to—year
change in U.S. wage growth ranks first among the three nations before
1914 and after 1922, and is tied for second place during the World War
I era. The GNP deflator generally mirrors the behavior of wages, with
a tendency for prices in the U.S. to be less volatile relative to wages,
whereas in the other two countries prices are either as variable or more
variable than wages.
A more interesting set of results is presented in Table 5, which
is analogous to Table 2. The top half of the table displays coefficients
of response of annual wage changes to current and two lagged changes in
nominal GNP. All regression equations also contain a constant term,
and, to maintain consistency with my other papers, two dummy variablesTABLE 4
Means and Standard Deviations








U.S. 4.71 6.96 1.65
U.K. 2.39 6.12 2.19
Japan 6.68 12.23 4.71
Wage rate (w)
U.s. 1.79 7.94 2.22
U.K. 0.48 7.59 0.25
Japan 4.63 12.27 0.73
GNP Deflator (p)
U.S. 0.93 5.64 —0.73
U.K. 0.52 7.89 —0.16
Japan 3.79 7.85 1.09
Standard Deviations
Nominal GNP (y)
u.s. 6.77 15.58 11.65
U.K. 3.08 14.07 5.30
Japan 10.53 16.33 8.51
Wage rate (w)
U.S. 4.46 13.21 6.71
U.K. 1.63 15.12 4.08
Japan 3.98 13.28 5.20
GNP Deflator (p)
U.s. 2.87 12.36 4.20
U.K. 1.76 14.16 3.53
Japan 4.99 13.97 7.15
Note: a. Starting dates are: U.S. 1892; U.K. 1873;Japan 1881.
Source: See data appendix
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for the U.S. The first captures the impact of price controlsduring the
last year of World War I, and the second captures the marked but tem-
porary impact of the National Recovery Act in raising wages and prices
in 1933 and 1934. The dummy variables are defined in a special form
that imposes the restriction that the termination of each program of
government intervention completely reversed its effect on the price or
wage level.'0
The most important conclusion in Table 5 can be gleaned from column
(4), which shows the sums of coefficients on current and two lagged
values of nominal GNP. Here the three countries display roughly similar
degrees of wage responsiveness, whereas, in Table 2 for the postwar period,
the U.S. is a definite outlier. In Table 5, the smallest value forwages
in column (4) is achieved by Japan during 1881—1913; this may reflect
measurement error rather than a substantive difference (note the much
higher responsiveness of the GNP deflator in Japanfor this period in the
bottom part of the table).11 The other main patterns for wages are the
uniform increase across countries in the degree of responsiveness during
World War I, and the evidence of a substantial decline in responsiveness
in the U.S. after 1922 as compared to pre—1914.
The results for the GNP deflator, displayed in the bottom half of
the table, seem generally consistent with those for wages. In all
countries price responsiveness increased during World War I, a phenomenon
I have explained by formulating a theory in which people use common in-
formation on the variance of aggregate demand shocks to guess what will
happen to their costs of purchased inputs (198la, pp. 519—25). This
theoretical explanation is also roughly consistent with the JapaneseTABLE 5
Regressions of Changes in Wage Rates and the GNP Deflator








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Wage Changes
Starting Datea_1913
U.S. .376**.413** —.047 .742 .589 3.08
U.K. .246** .191** .159** .596 .635 1.14
Japan .101** —.037 .114** .252 .223 3.87
1913—1922
U.S. .628** .388** .103 1.119 0.0 .962 3.65
U.K. .376** .764** .442*1.582 .911 5.71
Japan .230 .468** .242 .940 .879 5.82
1923—1940
U.S. .296**.283** —.lll .468 12.2** .844 3.02
U.K. .376** .215* .153* .744 ——— .686 2.51
Japan .314** .124 .231** .669 ——— .820 3.35
Price Changes
Starting Dated_1913
U.S. .275** .193** .032 .498 .501 2.19
U.K. .346** .118 .113 .577 .421 1.75
Japan •475** .124* .213** .812 .573 5.78
1913—1922
U.S. .644**.374** —.147 .871 _8.1** .959 3.52
U.K. .742** .262* •439** 1.443 ——— .940 4.36
Japan .774** .097 —.033 .838 ——— .812 2.48
1923—1940
U.S. .267**.110** —.019 .358 49** .886 1.62
-U.K. .326** .226** .122* .674 ——— .754 1.93
Japan .530**.352** —.070 .812 ——— .820 3.35
Notes: a. Starting dates are the same as in Table 4.
Asterisks designate significance levels of sums of coefficients,
as follows: 10 percent (*) and 5 percent (**).
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results, which show a large but fairly stable price response in the three
periods, since Table 4 reveals that the variance of Japanese nominal CNP
growth was relatively high in all three sub—periods.
In a recent study of the Great Depression (with James Wilcox, 1981),
I called attention to the greater flexibility of prices in Europe than
in the U.S. as a partial explanation for the relatively milder and shorter
Depression in Europe. Table 5 for the 1923—40 sub—period confirms that
U.S. wages and prices, while sufficiently flexible to absorb (after a
one—year lag) roughly half of the nominal spending change in the case
of wages, and about one—third in the case of prices, neverthelesswere
less flexible than in Britain and Japan. It would thusappear that the
phenomenon of sluggish wage and price responsiveness had begun toemerge
in the U.S. before World War II, prior to the invention of thethree—year
staggered wage contract in 1948.25
III. THE ORGANIZATION OF LABOR MARKETS
The empirical results in the preceding section establish, at least
for the postwar period, that changes in the manufacturingwage bill were
accompanied by greater changes in hours worked, and by lesser changes in
nominal wages, in the U.S. than in Britain or Japan. Among the institu-
tional arrangements that might help to explain these empirical phenomena
are the postwar U.S. system of three—year staggered, overlapping, and
imperfectly escalated wage contracts, the absence in Britain of written
wage agreements, and the Japanese institutions of lifetime employment and
bonus payments. To determine what elements economic theory can contribute
to an explanation of these international differences, this section identi-
fies a set of ideal institutions dictated by purely economic considerations.
Then Part IV compares these to real—world practices in the three nations.
Is an important element of inefficiency introduced because real—world labor—
market institutions were invented spontaneously by decentralized and un-
coordinated actions of economic agents, rather than by the firm hand of an
up—to—date economic theorist?
The organization of the analysis corresponds to the central distinction
between real shocks, i.e., innovations or oil cartels, and nominal shocks,
i.e., changes in the supply of money. The recent theory of labor markets
is amenable to a corresponding division between purely real factors that
foster income stability and long—term attachments between firms and workers,
and the interaction of real and nominal factors that determine the extent
-to which indexation will insulate the real economy from nominal disturbances.26
III. 2 Long-term Worker-Firm Attachments in the Face of Real Shocks
In the simple labor—market model of the elementary textbook, there
are neither institutions nor long-term attachments. Supply equals demand,
and there is a three—way equality between the real wage, the marginal
product of labor, and the marginal value of time (or disutility of work).
If the schedules have the usual shapes, a negative productivity shock
reduces labor input and the real wage, but a shift in nominal demand has
no effect on either real variable.There is no need to introduce formal
indexation, since the freely adjusting wage automatically mimics the move-
ments of the freely adjusting price. Two separate lines of intellectual
development have emerged to explain long—term attachments between firms
and workers. The first treats workers as homogeneous and was stimulated
by the original models of Azariadis (1975), Baily (1974), and Donald F.
Gordon (1974), each of which independently introduced the assumption that
workers are more averse to risk than firms. The second introduces a
training cost or Ittolltt that differentiates among members of the labor
force, was invented by Gary Becker (1962), and has been the subject of in-
numerable papers, including the recent formal analysis of Mortensen (1979)
and extended verbal treatment by Okun (1981).
The Quest for Real Income Insurance. The Azariadis—Baily—Gordon
(A—B—G) model explains why firms would offer real income insurance to risk—
averse workers. Seeking income stability, workers are willing to accept
a smaller mean income over the cycle from a firm offering a stable income
-than from one offering a variable income, and competition forces all firms
match the stable—income offer. Firms "sell" real income insurance to27
workers, accepting greater instability in profits and, in conditions o.f a
sharp leftward shift in the real demand for labor, standing ready to
finance losses on the perfect capital market. Although initially heralded
in corridor conversation as providing a microeconomic foundation of the
Keynesian phenomena of rigid nominal wages and involuntary layoff unem-
ployment, the A—B—G model——it soon became apparent——could explain neither.
Consider the standard version of the A—B—C model with risk—averse
workers, risk—neutral firms, a known distribution of states of nature, an
atemporal setting in which present choices have no future consequences, a
prohibition on mobility of workers between firms after the invisible
handshake, and a symmetric access by workers and firms to information
about the state of nature that has actually occurred. Since all the
elements of the model are stated in real terms, there is no impact of a
purely nominal disturbance, which can be absorbed by a fully escalated
nominal wage.
The effects of shifts in the real demand schedule depend on which of
several assumptions are made about the preferences of workers and the nature
of unemployment compensation, if any. With a utility function for workers
that is separable in consumption and leisure, and with no unemployment
compensation, firms offer a fixed income. A leftward shift in real labor
demand causes firms to eliminate those hours each day or week which yield
a marginal product below the value of time. Because all workers are
identical, hours reductions are shared equally, and no worker is fully
unemployed.
Now we add an additional assumption, which in the theoretical jargon
is called "a lump—sum reward for unemployment." This must be funded by28
some source besides the firm itself, e.g., a general tax. Now firmscan
offer workers a larger compensation package if theylay off individual
workers to make them eligible for the lump-sumreward, instead of imposing
an evenly shared reduction in hours. The individualsreceiving the layoff
notice are not at all unhappy about their lot, because the firmcontinues
to provide them with a stable income by paying laid—off workers the
difference between the wage of employed workers and thesum of (a) the
unemployment reward and (b) the value of leisure. Thus the A—B—C model
can explain layoffs only through the intervention of a special kind of
outside—financed unemployment compensation system, and theresulting un-
employment is not involuntary. Involuntary unemployment in this model
requires the unsupported and arbitrary assumption that firms cut thepay
packet of inactive workers (including leisure and the outside reward)
below the packet of active workers.
When the assumption of symmetric information is dropped, then firms
maybeable to determine the true state of nature and to conceal it from
workers. Once workers have agreed to workany required amount for a
fixed income, firms have an obvious incentive to overstate labor demand
and ask workers to supply (implicitly forever) an above—normal number of
hours. Recognizing the incentive of firms to cheat, workers will insist
on an arrangement that allows a change in hours to occur only if income
responds positively. Guillermo Calvo and Edmund S. Phelps (1977), Robert
E. Hall and David Lilien (1979), and Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart (1980),
have all shown that income and hours worked willvary in the same direction
when information is asymmetric. Phelps (1977) was the first tocapture
the irony that in this context the A—B—G model yields just the same result29
as the old—fashioned textbook model: "It is just as we always thought——
prior to the advent of state—contingent contract theory!" (1977, p. 153).
Income variability can also be deduced with symmetric information,
when the assumption of completely risk—neutral firms is dropped. Firms
may not be able to absorb unlimited losses. While local supply shocks may
be diversifiable, some risks are economy—wide and nondiversifiable.
Herschel Grossman (1977) shows that there is some level of the marginal
product of labor sufficiently low to prevent firms from absorbing all
risk. A further and more complex analysis with the A—B—G model introduces
dynamics. Firms attempt to assess the likelihood that employees may
quit in good times to obtain a wage higher than the fixed income level.
Dynamic analysis also erodes the significance of the asymmetric information
assumption; firms are unlikely to cheat when they know that workers may
soon learn the true outcome and shun them forever.
What, then, does the A-B—G model contribute to an understanding of
international differences in labor—market arrangements? It cannot explain
differences in nominal wage responsiveness, since it is stated entirely
in real terms. It can explain the greater reliance on layoffs in the U.S.
than in Britain and Japan as a result of differences in unemployment com-
pensation systems, but the role of unemployment insurance can be discussed
independently of the A—B—C model and assumptions. Finally, the A—B—G
model does not explain long—term attachments between firms and workers,
but rather assumes this outcome by basing its analysis on an atemporal
world with no ex post mobility. Its main positive contribution within
the context of this paper is to stress the potential role of firms as
intermediaries providing real income insurance; the ability and willingness30
of firms to stabilize incomes in
a particular country, i.e., Japan,may
depend on size of firms, diversification,
attitudes toward risk in financial
markets, debt—equity ratios, and other factorsrelated to the A—B—G
analysis. 12
Firm Specific Human Capital andSeniority Rules. A more fruitfulap-
proach to the explanation of long—term worker—firmattachments was intro-
duced by Becker (1962), whoargued that the costs and returns from invest-
ments in firm—specific capital would beshared by the firm and its workers.
For the firm to capture all of thereturn would leave the employee with
nothing to "glue" him to the firm and would leadto excessive quits; for
the worker to capture all of thereturn would leave the firm with no in—
centive to train him. In Okun's (1981)terminology the initial training
and hiring investment can be likenedto a "toll," collected at thebeginning
of the worker's attachment, the incidenceof which must be divided between
worker and firm. The resultingrelationship, in which each party has an
investment, is Okun's "career labor market."Since nothing in the career
labor—market model prevents theresulting wage from being fully escalated
to the price level, the Becker—Okunanalysis should not be viewed as
providing an explanation of business cycles, butrather of institutions
like separation procedures andpenalties, seniority rules, age—earnings
profiles, compulsory overtime, and mandatoryretirement.
Hashimoto (1979), Nortensen (1979), andLorne Carmichael (1980) have
analyzed the consequences for the humancapital model of imperfect but
symmetric information; the realized surplus availableto be divided depends
on productivity, which the firm knows moreabout, and job satisfaction,
which the worker knows more about. Eachparty has an incentive to influence31
the division of the surplus by cheating, with
firms understating produc-
tivity and workers understating job satisfaction.. Anoptimal arrangement
would appear to involve separation penalties. Aworker who is dissatis-
fied may quit, but must pay a separationpenalty equal to the firm's lost
training investment; a firm dissatisfied with alow—productivity worker
can fire him, but must offer a severancepayment.
The fact that these "symmetric separationpenalty" contracts are not
observed is attributed by Carmichael to moralhazard introduced by the
need to distinguish between a quit anda fire in order to administer the
separation penalties. Firms have an incentive to makeworkers unhappy
and get them to quit, so that the "firing"penalty will be saved, and
workers have an incentive to slack off untilthey get fired, thus earning
the "firing" penalty. From this observationCarmichael proceeds to show
that seniority rules for layoffs andpromotions can reproduce the turnover
incentives of the penalty contracts without thesame exposure to moral
hazard. Seniority rules allow inter—workertransfers, with junior workers
"collecting" from senior workers who quit, in the formof promotion and
protection from layoffs. The moral hazard problemdisappears, because the
junior worker moves up the ladder regardless of whetherthe separation is
a quit or a fire.
The possibility that workersmay featherbed on the job has an impact
on the form of labor—market institutions. Ina pair of papers, Edward
Lazear (1979) (1981) has shown that it ispossible to explain important
features of existing institutions,particularly mandatory retirement and
a positively sloped age—earnings profile,as optimal in a competitive
labor market. A steep age—earnings relationalters a worker's incentives32
to perform efficiently on the job. The productivity of each hourspent
working is increased when the bulk of wage payments is delayed until
relatively late in life, since the worker is more anxious to please the
firm in order to avoid a job termination. Thus thewage schedule may rise
with experience, even if productivity does not, a phenomenon that iscon-
sistent not just with the Japanese lifetime employment system, but also
with recent findings by James Medoff and Katherine Abraham (1980) in a
study of several U.S. firms.
An undesirable side effect of the steep age—earnings profile is that,
if hours are freely chosen, young workers work too little and older
workers work too much. Since there is only one degree of freedom, the
wage rate adjusts the effort margin and quantity constraints (compulsory
overtime; mandatory retirement) determine hours. Hence it.is not sur-
prising that we observe complaints by younger workers about compulsory
overtime (which they may try to fight with absenteeism), while older workers
complain about being prevented from working as much as they would like.
Mandatory retirement goes hand—in—glove with a steep age—earnings profile,
since the firm cannot afford to expose itself to a period of unpredictable
length during which the worker receives more than his marginal product.
This approach relies on the fact that it is easier to monitor the number
of hours worked than the amount of effort expended, and for this reason
belongs in the class of human capital models that incorporate imperfect
information.
III. 2 Contract Length and Indexation
- InArthur words, Ttthere are more reasons than we need to ex-
plain why real—world employers care about retaining experienced workers"33
(1981, p. 48). Risk aversion, monitoring costs, and training costs, can
lead to long-term attachments between firms and workers. But now, to ex-
plain why real variables are not completely insulated from nominal
disturbances, we must determine which contingencies, if any, should be
included in the written or unwritten contracts binding workers and firms.
A basic idea that runs through the literature, e.g., Azariadis (1981),
is that the choice of contract form can be posed as an economic tradeoff.
"Naivet' contracts that predetermine prices or wages without new information
are cheap to write but expose agents to inefficient outcomes when unpre-
dictable events occur. Contingent contracts that incorporate new informa-
tion are more costly to write but can minimize or eliminate risk. The
tradeoff is easiest to understand in J0 Anna Gray's (1978) analysis of
optimal contract length.13 If a fixed cost is incurred each time a con-
tract is renegotiated, then amortization of the fixed cost calls for a long
contract duration. But if the contract does not eliminate all conceivable
risks, then a long contract duration exposes agents to a larger potential
efficiency loss than a short duration. Thus contract length depends in-
versely on the expected level of uncertainty. If contracts can be written
to eliminate all real consequences of purely nominal disturbances, then the
variance of nominal aggregate demand is irrelevant for choosing the contract
length, and only uncertainty about potential real supply shocks matters.
The U.S. postwar three—year wage contract, as contrasted to shorter contract
lengths in Britain and Japan, would be explained within the Gray framework
as the consequence of relatively high perceived renegotiation costs and a
relatively low level of uncertainty in the U.S.34
What range of possible contingencies will be written into contracts?
Asymmetric information mitigates against contracts contingent on "local"
variables specific to the firm, e.g., firm sales, product price, or worker
productivity. As in the Grossman—Hart and Hall—Lilien models, any. inftma—
tional advantage on the part of the employer leads to a moral hazard problem,
that the firm has an incentive to understate the realization of the varia-
ble on which the wage is contingent, in order to minimize wage cost.
Contracts are thus more likely to be contingent on aggregate nominal varia-
bles, i.e., the consumer price index and/or the money supply. But, as
Gray's paper shows, indexation to a consumer price index rigidifies real
wage growth over the life of the contract. While this is an optimal out-
come if all disturbances are nominal, and the growth of productivity is
perfectly predictable, full consumer—price indexation imposes an efficiency
loss when an unpredictable supply shock (e.g., OPEC) changes the equilibrium
real wage.
Since full indexation to the consumer price index has the fatal
defect that it rigidifies the real wage, an appealing alternative is
indexation to nominal GNP, since this allows the real wage to adjust auto-
matically to unexpected changes in productivity growth (the advantages
and disadvantages of indexation to a nominal monetary aggregate are
treated below in paragraph (3)). Adopting the notation in Part I above,
with changes in nominal GNP, prices, actual real GNP, and equilibrium
*
realGNP designated respectively as y, p, q, and q ,wehave the identity:
* *
(6)y—q p+q—q35
Let us assume for convenience that equilibrium labor input isconstant, so
labor productivity growth in equilibrium is the same as equilibrium real
CNP growth (q ).Thenindexation of the wage rate to nominal GNP (w =y)
implies, when substituted into (6):
* *
(7)w—p q + (q—q).
Thus growth in the real wage (w —p)automatically reflects equilibrium
*
productivitygrowth (q ) as long as there are no fluctuations in real out—
*
putrelative to its equilibrium value (q —q=0).
No matter how superficially attractive, nominal GNP indexing of wage
contracts has never been observed. This occurs, I suggest, because four
sets of barriers prevent agents from making the comfortable assumption
that real business cycles have been vanquished (q —q*=0)and therefore
in (7) that the growth of the real wage mimics the growth of productivity.
The barriers are (1) pre—set prices and wages, (2) foreign trade, (3) in-
formation imperfections and delays, and (4) velocity shifts.
(1) Pre-set prices and wages. I have recently argued (1981a) that
firms have a legitimate reason to fear that nominal GNP fluctuations will,
at least initially, take the form of real GNP fluctuations. First, in many
markets it is efficient for prices to be pre—set rather than established
in auction markets, to save on the time and transportation costs that
centralized auctions impose. Second, prices that are preset for even a
short interval imply that firms will initially experience a nominal fluc-
tuation as a real event——a decline in real purchases at the initially pre-
set price. Their expectation that the real demand shock will soon be
eliminated depends on the speed with which costs of inputs purchased from36
other firms mimic the movement in nominal demand. If information on the
nominal stock is imperfect, firms may, at least initially, interpret it
as local rather than aggregate in nature and may believe that there is no
reason for their input costs to move in proportion to the demand shift.
Once it is admitted that individual product prices, and hence theag-
gregate price level, may adjust gradually to changes in nominal CNP, then
workers will fear the consequences of nominal—indexedwage contracts.
Consider a 20 percent decline in nominal GNP, accompanied initiallyby
only a 10 percent decline in the aggregate price level. Workers having a
wage contract indexed to nominal GNP would experience a decline in their
real wage of 10 percent. Eventually prices would adjust fully inproportion
to the nominal GNP change, but workers, particularly if they are risk
averse, would object to the instability of real wages implied by nominal—
GNP indexation in a world of gradual price adjustment.
The preceding paragraph is unconventional in that it deduces nominal
wage stickiness from price stickiness, while it is more common to do the
reverse. But in fact the argument works both ways. If nominal wages do
not adjust instantly, then firms face nominal marginal costs that are less
than unit elastic with respect to nominal GNP changes. The problem is
properly treated as dynamic rather than static, in which several sources
of resistance to full nominal indexation interact and reinforce each other.
(2) Foreign trade. When firms observe an increase or decrease in
their real sales at the initially pre—set price, their choice of a new
price depends on a guess about the fraction of the demand shift representing
a nominal aggregate shock, as opposed to a real aggregate or real local
shock, and, a guess about the extent to which suppliers of inputs recognize37
the aggregate component of the shock. As will be recognized by economists
in Britain, Japan, and other open economies, the perceived stickiness of
marginal cost is a rational response when agents recognize that a sub-
stantial fraction of theIr. inputs are imported from abroad, where suppliers
may have been unaffected by an aggregate nominal demand shock that is
national rather than international in origin. Full insulation of real
sales from a perceived nominal national disturbance would require that
each agent (a) assumes his national suppliers immediately perceive the same
shock and (b) ignores the fact that suppliers of imports are unaffected by
a national demand shock. Both (a) and (b) surely strain credulity.
(3) Information imperfections and delays. Prior to the postwar
development of monetary aggregates and national income accounts, timely
measures of nominal aggregates did not exist, as good a reason as any to
explain why nominal aggregate indexation has never occurred. Even today,
nominal GNP indexation would require a two—month average delay in the U.S.,
(data for the second quarter, entered on Nay 15, become available in the
third week of July). Lags are considerably longer in some other countries.
Wage contracts indexed to nominal GNP thus cannot prevent a short—run re-
duction in hours worked in situations when nominal GNP growth suddenly
decelerates, as in the U.S. in l980:Q2 and 1981:Q2. Profit—maximizing firms
naturally resist the implications of nominal GNP indexation that, because
of information lags in situations of temporary fluctuations of nominal GNP
growth, they reduce prices just when the economy is recovering and raise
prices just when it is collapsing.38
(4) Velocity s1ifts. Information on monetary aggregates i avail-
able fairly promptly, but indexation to a particular monetary aggregate
cannot insulate real variables even if information is contemporaneous.
Stochastic disturbances in commodity and money demand functions, which may
be serially correlated, lead to serially correlated fluctuations in the
velocity of money. A price—setting agent choosing to index his product
price to Ml in the U.S. would find that a slump in real sales would occur
in any week or month in which velocity grows more slowly than the average
written into the indexation formula.
111.3 Conclusions Regarding Optimal Labor-Market Arrangements
Contractual arrangements cannot obviate fluctuations of hours worked
in response to fluctuations in real supply or in nominal demand. Firms
and workers are both unwilling to accept the risk implied by a contract
that is fully indexed to nominal spending or money. If it is impossible
to eliminate fluctuations in nominal demand, then labor—market contracts
should be of relatively short duration. Frequent contract renewals can
partially substitute for the absence of nominal GNP indexation, by allow-
ing the latest information on both real and nominal shocks to be incorpor-
ated into wage—setting and price—setting decisions.
Firms are not entirely indiffereüt about the extent of fluctuations
in their profits. This being the case, contracts should not only be of
short duration, but in addition should expire simultaneously across all
firms. Simultaneous contract renegotiation is preferable to staggered
-contracts, because workers are more likely to accept a slower rate of wage
growth in response to a nominal GNP slump if they are in the same boat,39
than if one group of workers is asked to accept a sacrifice that was not
required of another group whose contract was settled a month or two
earlier.
Short contract durations, while minimizing allocational losses in the
face of uncertainty, impose extra fixed costs of renegotiation. There is
a shortage of degrees of freedom. Contract duration, a single institution,
cannot perform two different functions——the achievement of macroeconomic
efficiency and the resolution of conflicts over income shares. Efficiency
requires short contracts, while the minimization of negotiation and strike
costs requires long contracts. Thus an economic theorist designing insti-
tutions must simply decree that the initial income distribution is just,
and is not to be the subject of disputes at contract renegotiation time, if
he wants contract duration to be chosen to maximize macroeconomic efficiency.
Efficient labor—market institutions to achieve microeconomic efficiency
would seem to involve an age—earnings profile that is steeper than the age—
productivity profile, together with mandatory retirement, in order to in-
duce efficient performance and avoid featherbedding by younger workers.
Seniority rules should be instituted for promotions and hours reductions.
Unemployment compensation should be paid proportional to hours of time
lost, rather than days of full—time work lost, in order to encourage work—
sharing. To the extent that it is actually necessary for firms to lay
workers off, seniority rules should be adopted that concentrate job layoffs
on junior workers, in whom there is likely to be a smaller cumulative
training investment.40
IV. ORIGINS OF LABOR-MARKET INSTITUTIONS IN
JAPAN, THE U.K., ANDTHEU.S.
Many of the labor—market arrangements selected by the economic
theorist to achieve macroeconomic efficiency and high productivityappear
to correspond rather closely to well—known features of the Japanese labor
market. Long—term attachments between workers and firms are formalized in
the lifetime employment system, with wage flexibility encouraged through
a semi—annual variable bonus. The seniority wage, or nenko, system, in
its purest form relates earnings solely to length of service and not to
work performance. Wage renegotiations take place annually and are roughly
simultaneous during the "spring wage offensive."
If Japanese labor—market institutions are more compatible with macro-
economic efficiency than those in the U.K. and U.S., we may naturally
wonder whether the Japanese achievement occurred by design or historical
accident. Andy, by comparing the historical background, we may try to
identify those basic forces that inhibit change in the other two countries.
My central theme is the differing role of labor—management and class con-
flict in the three nations, forcing labor—market institutions in the U.K.
and U.S. to be geared mainly to the resolution of disputes rather than the
achievement of macroeconomic efficiency. This theme parallels the theorist's
demonstration that wage contracts cannot perform two functions at once,
and that social conflict would simply have to be abolished by decree in
order to allow contract renegotiations to concentrate on macroeconomic
-efficiency.In stressing the role of social conflict as an indirect ex-
planation for cross—country differences in macroeconomic performance, I41
have been influenced by Albert Hirschman's parallel finding that in Latin
America:
Various groups maintain and prize an attitude and
phraseology of unbending opposition and hostility. .. TheChilean
situation appears to be weighted more heavily with the avoidance
of agreement, with the maintenance of a militant stance on the part
of all contending groups. In a sense, this stance is the desired
benefit and inflation is its cost" (1973, pp. 208—9).
IV.2TheJapanese System
Underlying Japanese institutions is a stratification system, based
on nonoccupational criteria, that is deeply rooted in social relations.
This tradition "suggests that vertical, that is, hierarchical, social
relations rather than those based upon egalitarian norms represent the
ideal" (Kazuo Okochi, Bernard Karsh, and Solomon Levine, 1974, P. 485).
Analysts dating back to Thorstein Veblen have attributed the high degree
of respect for authority to the rapidity of Japan's forced—draft transi-
tion from a feudal to an industrial society. "It is in this unique com-
bination of a high—wrought spirit of feudalistic fealty and chivalric honor
with the material efficiency given by the modern technology that the
strength of the Japanese nation lies" (Veblen, 1915, p. 25l_2).1
The lifetime employment system apparently developed after World War
I with the introduction of belt conveyors and assembly lines. Previously
Japanese skilled workers had been mobile and independent, but the new
production processes required workers with narrow skills on particular
machines rather than broad, easily transferable skills. This transition
seems compatible with Becker's distinction between general and firm—specific42
human capital, and implies that firms moved to the lifetime employment
system in order to amortize their specific training investment. Worker
loyalty was cemented by the seniority wage structure, combined (as in
Lazear's model) with the rule of mandatory retirement at the age of fifty—
five.
Since British and American factories had introduced similar production
techniques earlier, the existence of firm—specific human capital is clearly
insufficient to explain the unique features of the Japanese lifetime em-
ployment system. Walter Galenson and Konosuke Odaka argue that another
necessary ingredient is homogeneity of the work force, since hetero-
geneity in worker ability makes it inefficient to base wage payments ex-
clusively on seniority. While there is nodoubt that the massive immigra-
tion into the U.S. during the main period of industrialization made
American workers less homogeneous than the Japanese, this consideration
does not seem to have much payoff in explaining differences between the
Japanese and British systems.15
Differences in the degree of long—term attachment betweenworkers and
firms across the three nations should not beexaggerated. The Japanese
lifetime employment system is mainly concentrated inlarge firms, ends at
age 55, and does not apply to women or employees of numerous subcontractors
and other satellites that act as a bufferduring economic downturns. In
the U.S., as Hall (1980) has shown, asurprisingly large fraction of U.S.
workers hold what are essentially lifetime jobs
(although not to the ex—
tent prevalent in Japan).16 Thus what is unique about theJapanese system
is not so much the average duration of the worker—firmattachment, but43
rather the role of seniority rather than ability in determining payment.
Galenson and Odaka consider the nenko payment system an important way in
which grievances are minimized in the Japanese system, and this fits in
with our theme of conflict—minimization:
"All employees, once hired, are entitled equally to all the
rights and privileges of the organization to which they
belong. There may be variations in individual talent, but it
is assumed that everyone is doing his best to serve the company
in his ownway;no one should be discriminated against."17
Another ingredient in the Japanese system is the integration of
economic and social life within the large firm. William Ouchi's dis—
cussion implies that this custom, which he attributes to the "historical
accident" that Japan "rushed" from feudalism to a modern industrial
society, plays a large role in conflict avoidance:
"Intimacy of this sort discourages selfish or dishonest
action in the group, since abused relationships cannot be
left behind. People who live in a company dormitory, play
ona company baseball team, work together on five different
committees, and know the situation will continue for the rest
of their lives develop a unique relationships. Values and
beliefs become mutually compatible over a wide range of work—
related and non—work—related issues."15
At the heart of conflict avoidance in the Japanese system is a
-greaterdegree of equality, with less influence of social class, so that44
there is less to fight about. Nathan Glazer (1976, PP. 887—8), states
flatly, "The Japanese factory or company is at present perhaps the most
egalitarian in the world, outside China. ..Clearly,class is relatively
less evident than in England, and even relatively less evident than in
the United States." Glazer's summary of in—plant sociological studies
cites the absence of any distinction of dress between white—collar and
manual workers; the informal familiar level of speech used within the
factory contrasted with the formal level of address used with those on the
outside; the lack of distinction between annual salaries and hourly pay;
the one—class company cafeteria (no executive dining room); and communal-
ity of access to sick pay, sports clubs, and vacation resorts.'9 It may
seem paradoxical that the Japanese combine a greater respect for hierarchy
with greater equality in the perquisites of managers and workers, but this
seems to be explained by the non—occupational nature of Japanese attitudes
toward hierarchy.2°
I have stressed conflict avoidance, because I believe that this
helps to explain why the Japanese have one—year wage contracts and why the
U.S. has three—year wage contracts. But there are two other important
features of the Japanese system that foster macroeconomic efficiency, the
simultaneity of contract expiration dates in the spring wage negotiations,
and the prevalence of flexible wages in the form of bonus payments. The
spring wage offensive, or Shunto, developed in 1955 at the initiative of
the largest of the Japanese labor federations. Despite the fact that the
actual bargaining takes place between management and the enterprise union
at each firm, the institution of the simultaneous offensive seems to have
brought about some standardization of wage increases across firms45
(Galenson and Odaka, pp. 644—5). The simultaneity of the offensive may
be partially explained as an attempt by the Japanese trade union movement
to compensate for its basic weakness and fragmentation.21 The greater
power and strike—proneness of American labor may help to explain the per-
sistence of staggered contract expiration dates, in spite of its macro-
economic inefficiency, since government and management may have reason to
fear that a simultaneous expiration date would make possible a nationwide
general strike.
The bonus system is interpreted by Hashimoto as a form of profit
sharing, which in turn makes another contribution to conflict avoidance.
The practice developed along with the nenko compensation system in order
to "enhance the loyalty and commitment of employees to their firms"
(1979, p. 1090). By studying cross—section differences among Japanese
firms, Hashimoto concludes that high profitability and "the low costs of
reaching agreements, that is, low transactions costs," help to explain the
widespread use of bonusses. All the major elements of the Japanese system
seem to interact together, acting as a "virtuous circle" from the standpoint
of macroeconomic efficiency. Paternalism and relative equality encourage
conflict avoidance, which in turn allows firms to maintain high profit-
ability, while sharing part of the profits with workers in the form of
cyclically sensitive bonus payments.
IV.2 The BritishSystem
Thechief institutional features of British labor market institutions
are class consciousness, class conflict, labor militancy, and weak management.
These help to cause a low level and growth rate of productivity, which in46
turn, has both aggravated the struggle over income shares and has fostered
a macroeconomic policy that in the 1970s aggravated inflation through
monetary accommodation.
The greater importance of class distinctions in Britain was cited above
in Glazer's analysis of social equality in Japan. Dore (1973, p. 140)
stresses the contrast between the refusal of British workers and management
to accept the legitimacy of the power which the other enjoys, in contrast
to Japan where "both sides look forward to an indefinite future in which
their relations will not be very different from what they are now. Britain's
is an Arab—Israeli situation with shifting frontiers which only constant
vigilance can defend. Japan's is a Franco—German situation; there are
memories of monumental disputes over Alsace and the Saar, but now the
border is not an issue."
The sources of class consciousness go deep into Britisn history, stem-
ming partly from the unparalleled historical continuity of the political
and legal system and the absence of external conquest. In Mancur Olson's
(1977) analysis, common—interest organizations like labor unions are diffi-
cult to form spontaneously, because they provide collective goods for their
members and are subject to a free—rider problem, and once formed are diff i—
cult to change. He stresses the contrast between Britain, with its history
of victory in war and entrenched institutions, and both Germany and Japan
in which dictatorships and wartime defeat destroyed or weakened common—
interest groups. Two other historical events helping to explain the minor
role of class distinctions in Japan are the much more recent feudal period
of relative cultural homogeneity, and the fact that at the end of the
feudal period Japan created an almost completely universal school system47
in which "bureaucrats' Sons and fishmongers' sons absorbed a uniform
curriculum in the same schools" (Dore, p. 284). In contrast the British
three—way distinction between "public" (i.e., private), "grammar" (i.e.,
academic), and vocational secondary schools divided the population not
just by intellectual level, but also by accent and culture. Finally, the
class system fostered executive dining rooms and other barriers to shop—
floor communication, which in turn caused class distinctions and working
class distrust to become more firmly entrenched.
Lloyd Ulman (1968, pp. 331—2) notes that British workers tend not
only to be class conscious, but suspicious of progress and to have "an
atavistic opposition to redundancy" that is compounded of "an unfading
memory of prewar unemployment and a deep—seated distrust of employer
motives and capability." But management is not free of blame, failing
to control overmanning as a result of "hereditary nepotism in family—
owned concerns and backwardness in employing modern techniques for identi-
fying the profitability of investment opportunities" (p. 335).Tounion
"bloodymindedness" Ulman joins management "sleepyheadedness." "Labor
efficiency readily becomes a casualty in a prolonged encounter between a
management which is understaffed and inexpert in industrial relations and
members of a plant work force who find little reason to discard their
fathers' suspicion of class along with their fathers' ideology" (p. 338).
In the early postwar years Britisn labor relations were relatively
quiescent, and days lost from strikes were comparable to those in Japan
and far less than in the United States. But in the late l960s labor
militancy increased, and there was a substantial increase in the annual48
average days lost from strikes per 1,000 employed (Smith, p. 109):
1964—66 1967—71 1972—76
Japan 240 194 294
U.K. 190 608 968
U.S. 870 1644 1054
The increase in labor militancy manifested itself not only inmore strikes,
but in an acceleration in the growth of nominalwage rates that has been
identified by Perry (1975) and myself (1977) as having an autonomous
component rather than being entirely induced by prior episodes of monetary
expansion or incomes policy. David Soskice (1978, p. 245) traces the' rise
in militancy in Britain to the interaction of the 1967 devaluation and
incomes policies.
Ulman and Richard Caves (1980) both attribute low British productivity
and slow economic growth in part to labor militancy and the industrial
relations system. But what is the relationship of the system to the sub-
ject of this paper, the responsiveness of wages and employment to nominal
demand disturbances? The empirical evidence in Part II above exhibits varia-
bility and responsivenesé coefficients for British wages that are almost
identical to those for Japanese wages, and a standard deviation of employ-
ment changes that is about half of the American experience. I believe that,
in light of this evidence of wage responsiveness in Britain, the well—
known problems of inflation through the decade of the l970s and the diff i—
culties of adjustment in 1979—81 are the result of perverse government
'policy rather than an innately rigid wage adjustment system.49
Class conflict and labor militancy, together with thehistorical fact
that British party lines coincide with classdivisions, help to explain
why British governments have propogated inflation throughmonetary accom-
modation of wage push. The Labour party isnaturally averse to the tem-
porary increase in unemployment that would be required by a failure to
accommodate, and Conservative governments have often been in the position
of trying to buy off the unions in the hope that they will beable to
push through reforms in trade union law. The long history of accommodation
of wage explosions by the Bank of England, at least before1979, stems
partly from its lack of political independence, but may partly be the
result of a fear of confrontation between bankers and theunemployed
that dates back to the interwar years and the General Strike of 1926.
Table 3 above documents the significant positive feedback fromwage
changes to nominal GNP changes that has existed in Britain (but not in
Japan or the U.S.) as a result of monetary accommodation. The two—way
feedback between wages and nominal GNP evident in Table 3, together with
relatively high response coefficients, makes the British inflationprocess
particularly unstable. And, as Smith emphasizes, an additional element
in the vicious circle has been the feedback from inflation to trade union
militancy itself.
IV.3TheAmerican System
The central empirical result of this paper is the contrast between
sluggish wage adjustment in the U.S. and a high degree of wage responsive-
ness in Britain and Japan. The historical evidence supports the interpreta-
tion that the invention of the U.S. three—year staggeredwage contract in
the late l940s accounts for the inertia—bound character of U.S. postwar50
wage behavior. Thus our remaining task is to explain why these contracts
developed in the U.S., but not in Japan or Britain.
The 1948 contract between the United Auto Workers and General
Motors established two key features of U.S. wage bargains, the multi—
year agreement, and the inclusion of a cost—of—living escalator. Jo Anna
Gray's analysis provides the key hint in understanding this development,
since it was the high cost of negotiation, as perceived by managers
beseiged during 1946—48 with annual strikes or threats of strikes in core
industrie, that led to the 1948 General Motors contract. Charles E.
Wilson, GM President, had the idea of buying a long—term contract by
offering unions cost—of—living protection. In 1950 the auto companies
and the union signed a five—year contract, reopened in 1953, and since
1953 there have been nine three—year agreements.
In explaining why the U.S. developed three—year contracts, but the
Japanese did not, differences in the perceived importance of industrial
conflict must have played the major role. In Gray's model a higher degree
of uncertainty leads to shorter contracts, but the U.S. had more unstable
demand than Japan in the 1923—40 period, suggesting that negotiating costs
are the dominant factor. The more interesting question seems to be why
the British developed no such long—term contracts, since both the U.S. and
U.K. have similar histories of labor strife. First, the U.S. unIonized
in a hurry, after the 1935 Wagner Act turned Washington's previous red
light to green. Partly because unionization took the form of large industrial
unions in key industries, especially coal, steel, and autos, there was a
widespread perception that strikes were more costly in the U.S. than in
Britain. Andinfact strikes were much more widespread in the U.S., at51
least until the 1970s. Second, the United States has a legal tradition
dating back to its written Constitution. Partially because it isa more
heterogeneous society than Britain, there has been a tendency to put
everything into written agreements, and to establish an enormous legal
profession to interpret and argue about the nuances of written contracts.
The aversion to written agreements in Britain is attributed by Dore (1973,
p. 145) to deep—seated tradition: "Another factor contributing to this
situation is doubtless the ineffable British faith in the superior virtue
of relying on ancestral wisdom and the accumulation of 'custom andprac-
tice,' rather than on the written constitutions which lesser breeds need
as a crutch to help them manage their affairs." Third, firms in Britain
did not have the same opportunity to buy off the unions in return for
industrial peace, because they dealt with small craft unions rather than
large industrial unions, and because negotiations tended to occur;'at the
local plant level rather than at the national firm level. So the British
had less strife to induce a three—year contract, less of a legal tradition
to warrant a written contract as an escape from strife, and a less central-
ized union structure with whom to negotiate such an agreement.52
V. CONCLUSION
The basic argument of this paper comes down to three main points:
1. Macroeconomic instability in the United States has been
aggravated by the unusually sluggish behavior of nominal wages during the
postwar era. Whether measured as the standard deviation of wages relative
to hours worked, or the ratio of the respective response coefficients of
wages and hours worked to changes in nominal GNP, wages :in Britain and
Japan are five to ten times more responsive than in the U.S. Thus, of
any given fluctuation in aggregate nominal demand, a larger fraction
takes the form of a change in real output and employment in theU.S. than
in the U.K. or Japan.
2. The drastic decline of American wage responsiveness in the
postwar period as compared to the years between 1892 and 1940, together
with the 1948 invention of the three—year staggeredwage contract in the
American unionized industrial sector, seems to be more than coincidental.
It is not only the long duration of U.S. contracts, but also their
staggered nature, that makes wage changes relatively unresponsive to ex—
pansions or contractions in nominal GNP growth.
3. Japanese labor market institutions look much more like
those suggested as optimal by recent economic theory than do American in—
stitutions. Economic theory predicts that long—duration contractsare
more likely to emerge when the perceived cost of renegotiation is high,
but we must appeal to history and cultural differences in order toexplain
why conflict avoidance has played a much greater role in the development
of Japanese labor market institutions than in the American case. In this53
comparison Britain is the odd—man—out, with well—publicized industrial
strife, together with short contract durations. I appeal to history, the
different legal tradition, and the nature of British unions themselvesto
explain why the three—year contract became established in America but not
in Britain.
American economists for too long have sought purely economit explana-
tions of wage inertia, without recognizing the muchgreater degree of wage
responsiveness exhibited by Japan, Britain, and some other nations. They
have been too narrowly concerned with monetary explanations ofinflation,
as if money were an autonomous variable, and have insufficiently understood
that the dynamics of inflation emerge from a two—way interactionbetween,
on the one hand, the monetary and fiscal institutions of government, and,
on the other hand, society's wage— and price—setting institutions. The
economic theory of contracts has performed a useful service in showing how
the variance of nominal and real shocks interacts with costs ofnegotiation
in determining contract form and length, but economists must defer to
sociologists and historians (or unblushingly don the hat of amateur socio—
logist and historian) to learn why one society has a higher perceived cost
of negotiation and conflict resolution than another. I hope that this
fledgling exercise in comparative macroeconomic history will stimulate
future investigators to tackle themany puzzles and unanswered questions
that remain.2254
FOOTNOTES
1.The index of the late Arthur N. Okun'smuch—discussed final book
(1981) on wage and price adjustment containsonly one reference to
a foreign country, the U.K., and this is inconnection with incomes
policy rather than wage or price flexibility. Incriticizing the-
orists for their sins of omission, I do notmean to slight the com-
parative empirical papers that have called attentionto cross—country
differences in wage behavior, especially Nordhaus(1972), Perry
(1975), Gordon (1977), Sachs (1979), andBranson—Rotemberg (1980).
Sachs (pp. 303—7) does a particularly goodjob of calling attention
to labor market institutions as a source ofdiffering dynamic wage
behavior.
2. See also my recent cross—country analysis (198lb).As Walter Galenson
has pointed out to me, the 2 percentJapanese unemployment statistic
is misleading, since the government subsidizesfirms to carry the
unemployed on their payrolls.
3. The quotes are from Harry Johnson (1972,pp. 310—11). He was attack-
ing those, like Aubrey Jones (1973), who argued (p. 40) that "a
tightening of the money supply is not, therefore, a solutionto the
problem of rising prices."
4. This section summarizes an argument that isdeveloped in full in
Gordon (1975).
5.Equation (3) and some of the accompanying discussion overlaps Gordon
(l98la), p. 498.
6.I owe this idea to V. V. Chari.55
7.During this period Japanese employment grew very rapidly but hours
fell, creating a strong negative correlation between hours and em-
ployment growth, and leading to an even greater discrepancy between
the (h+e) and e results than appears in Table 1.
8.The dummy variables are those that I used in my latest detailed
analysis of U.S. postwar inflation (1981c).I experimented with
dummy variables for U.K. incomes policies, but decided that the
details of the procedure might aggravate my present audience and
detract their attention from the more important points in the paper.
9. Illustrating the greater volatility of growth in U.S. manufacturing
hours worked, the corresponding peak—trough—peak figures are 6.3
percent (1973:Q1), —12.8 percent (1974:Q2), and 6.3 percent (1976:Q2).
Because nominal GNP growth slowed down from 1973 to 1974, rather than
staying high as in Japan, the U.S. coefficients exhibit the expected
positive response of hours worked and employment to nominal GNP
changes.
10.Through an error of omission, the World War I variable was not in-
cluded in my paper using annual data (1980), but was included in the
quarterly study (l981a). Here it is defined as +1 for 1918 and —l
for 1920. The NRA variable, following (1980), is defined as follows:
1933, +0.35; 1934, +0.75; 1935, —0.75; 1936, —0.25. For a justifica—
tion of the use of dummy variables in the study of government inter-
vention programs, see Frye and Gordon (1981).
11.There also seems to be a negative correlation between wage and nominal
GNP changes during 1904—7, perhaps reflecting some program of govern-
ment intervention, with which I am not familiar, during or after the
Russo—Japanese war.56
12.A question may be raised as to the justification for a discussion
of the A—B—C model in the previous section, in light of its minor
usefulness for students of macroeconomic fluctuations. In light of
the substantial interest in this approach among economic theorists,
I think it important to provide an overall evaluation of its rela-
tion to macroeconomics, just as I have previously done (l976b,pp.
205—7) for the search/island model of Alchian, Phelps, Mortensen,
Holt, and others.
13. See also the explicitly dynamic analysis provided by Ronald Dye (1979).
14. Space does not permit a more extended quote from Veblen's fascinating
piece, which is perceptive in its comparisons of Germany and England
to Japan, although wrong in predicting that the distinctive character-
istics of the Japanese system would soon be eroded by industrialization.
Veblen explains the absence of feudal habits of thought in England as
a result of its much slower transition to industrialization: U
theconsequently changing state of the industrial arts among them [the
Englishj had time and scope concomitantly to work out its effect
upon the habits of thought of the community, and so to bring about a
state of the institutional conventions answering to the altered state
of the industrial arts" (1915, p. 154).
15.Koji Taira (1970, pp. 97—127) argues that the nenko system was
management's response to high labor turnover and absenteeism during
the period of industrialization. See also Dore (1973, Chapter 13).
16.In 1966, 56 percent of males aged 35 to 39 had more than ten year's
seniority in Japan, against only 34 percent of the same group in the
United States, according to Robert E. Cole (1972, p. 618).57
17.Galenson and Odaka, p. 610. The authors point out that economic
pressures, including problems of dealing with low—quality workers,
and the growing burden of high—cost older workers, have led to a
modest degree of shifting toward an ability basis for pay.
18.William Ouchi, "Individualism and Intimacy in an Industrial Society,"
Technology Review, July 1981, p. 36.
19.Numerous qualifications can be made to this sentence without altering
its validity as a statement about comparative equality across the
three countries. For instance, both Claser's text and Calenson in
correspondence with me mention the fact that most of the benefits of
the "expense account society" (limosines, meals, nights out on the
town) go to management. Glazer also points out that education is
beginning to play a larger role in determining status in the factory.
20. For more on the relative avoidance of conflict, see Galenson and
Odaka, pp. 638—42.
21.Galenson and Odaka, while stressing the complexity of the background,
provide a brief explanation of the weak union movement: "... the
initial hothouse growth of unionism under the American occupation, the
immediate factionalism along prewar lines, and the purge of communists
in 1950 imparted an internal instability that has proved impossible
to overcome" (1976, p. 629).
22.In particular I do not understand the high level of British unemploy-
ment in the 1920s in light of the suggestion of Table 5's high respon-
siveness coefficients that British wages should have adjusted promptly
to the return to gold in 1925. Also, the decline in the U.S. wage and
price responsiveness coefficients between the pre—1914 and 1923—40
period, as well as other shifts in coefficients identified elsewhere
(1980), remain as tantalizing mysteries.58
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DATA APPENDIX
Sources of Data Prior to World War II
U.S. All data come from U.S. Department of Commerce (1973)
Nominal GNP: Series A7, linked in 1909 to Series A8.
GNP deflator: Calculated as the ratio of nominal to realGNP,
where the latter is series Al linked in 1909 to
Series A2.
Wage rate: "Total compensation per hour of work in manufacturing,
production workers, in 1957 dollars," Series B70 times
"Consumer Price Index" series B69.
U.K. All data come from Feinstein (1972)
Nominal GNP: Table 1, col. (11).
GNP deflator at factor cost: Table 61, col. (7).
Wage rate: "Average full—time weekly wage rate," Table 65, coL (1).
Japan
Nominal GNP: Ohkawa (1957), Table 3, col. (1), linked in 1905 to
Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1973), Table 1, col. (6).
GNP deflator: Ohkawa (1957), Table 3, col. (1), divided by Table 4,
col. (1), linked in 1905 to Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1973),
Table 14, col. (3).
Wage rate: "Wage Index," Ohkawa (1957), Table 1, col. (1).Sources of Data After World War II
65
U.S.
Nominal GNP: Unpublished revised Department of Commerce data
obtained in January 1981.
All other data refer to the manufacturing sector andcome from a
computer printout supplied by the Division of Productivity Research,
Office of Productivity and Technology, Bureau of LaborStatistics,
February 1981:
"Hourly compensation including fringe benefits"
"Hours of all persons"
"Employment"
U.K.
All data come from the following sources:
1957:1—1978:2: OECD, Main Economic Indicators: Historical Statistics,
1957—1966 and 1960—1979.
1978:3—1980:3: OECD, Main Economic Indicators, February 1981:
"GDP at factor cost"
"Hourly rates in manufacturing"
"Weekly hours of work in manufacturing for Great Britain"
"Employment in manufacturing, all employees"
Japan
Data sources are the same as those for the U.K.:
"GNP at current market prices, billion yen"
"Monthly earnings (including bonuses) in manufacturing by
regular workers"
"Monthly hours of work in manufacturing by regular workers"
"Employment in manufacturing of regular workers"